000			02179cam a2200241 i 4500
003			MIUC
005			20181113104346.0
008			181113s2007 enka b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780199211890 (hbk.)
020			_a9780199585212 (pbk.)
040			_aDLC _cDLC _beng _dMIUC
082	0		_a338.9
100	1		_aBarrett, Scott _9604
245	1	0	_aWhy cooperate? : _bthe incentive to supply global public goods / _cScott Barrett.
260			_aOxford ; _aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c2007.
300			_axv, 258 p. : _bill. b&w ; _c23 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [245]-262) and index.
505	0		_aIntroduction: the incentives to supply global public goods -- Ch. 1. Single best efforts: global public goods that can be supplied unilaterally or minilaterally -- Ch. 2. Weakest links: global public goods that depend on the states that contribute the least -- Ch. 3. Aggregate efforts: global public goods that depend on the combined efforts of all states -- Ch. 4. Financing and burden sharing: paying for global public goods -- Ch. 5. Mutual restraint: agreeing what states ought not to do -- Ch. 6. Coordination and global standards: agreeing what states ought to do -- Ch. 7. Development: do global public goods help poor states? -- Conclusions: institutions for the supply of global public goods.
520			_aClimate change, nuclear proliferation, and the threat of a global pandemic have the potential to impact each of our lives. Preventing these threats poses a serious global challenge, but ignoring them could have disastrous consequences. How do we engineer institutions to change incentives so that these global public goods are provided? Scott Barrett provides a thought provoking and accessible introduction to the issues surrounding the provision of global public goods. Using a variety of examples to illustrate past successes and failures, he shows how international cooperation, institutional design, and the clever use of incentives can work together to ensure the effective delivery of global public goods.
650		0	_aPublic goods _9605
650		0	_aInternational cooperation _9606
942			_2ddc _cBK