000			02901nam a2200229 i 4500
003			MIUC
005			20181024121447.0
008			940912s1994 enk |b 001 | eng
020			_a9780801483332
040			_aUk _beng _cMIUC _dMIUC
082	0	4	_a332.042
100	1		_9506 _aHelleiner, Eric, _d1963-
245	1	0	_aStates and the reemergence of global finance : _bfrom Bretton Woods to the 1990s / _cEric Helleiner.
300			_aix, 244 p. ; _c24 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 211-235) and index.
505	0		_aCh. 1. Introduction -- Pt. 1. The restrictive Bretton woods financial order. Ch. 2. Bretton Woods and the Endorsement of Capital Controls. Ch. 3. Continuing Caution: The Slow and Limited Move to Convertibility -- Pt. 2. The reemergence of global finance. Ch. 4. Support for the Euromarket in the 1960s. Ch. 5. Failed Cooperation in the Early 1970s. Ch. 6. Four Turning Points in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s. Ch. 7. The Liberalization Trend in the 1980s. Ch. 8. Weathering International Financial Crises -- Pt. 3. Conclusion. Ch. 9. Explaining Differing State Behavior in Trade and Finance.
520			_aMost accounts explain the postwar globalization of financial markets as a product of unstoppable technological and market forces. Drawing on extensive historical research, Eric Helleiner provides the first comprehensive political history of the phenomenon, one that details and explains the central role played by states in permitting and encouraging financial globalization. Helleiner begins by highlighting the commitment of advanced industrial states to a restrictive international financial order at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference and during the early postwar years. He then explains the growing political support for the globalization of financial markets after the late 1950s by analyzing five sets of episodes: the creation of the Euromarket in the 1960s, the rejection in the early 1970s of proposals to reregulate global financial markets, four aborted initiatives in the late 1970s and early 1980s to implement effective controls on financial movements, the extensive liberalization of capital controls in the 1980s, and the containment of international financial crises at three critical junctures in the 1970s and 1980s. He shows that these developments resulted from various factors, including the unique hegemonic interests of the United States and Britain in finance, a competitive deregulation dynamic, ideological shifts, and the construction of a crisis-prevention regime among leading central bankers. In his conclusion Helleiner addresses the question of why states have increasingly embraced an open, liberal international financial order in an era of considerable trade protectionism.
650		0	_9505 _aInternational finance
650		0	_9507 _aMonetary policy
650		0	_9508 _aState, The
942			_2ddc _cBK